

# The political economy of pensions and pension reform

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## A little background




- The Chile 2008 pension reform
- Contents:
  - Creation of a "solidarity pillar"
  - More competition in the market of fund administrators
- Process
  - Expert commission
  - Ministers' committee
  - Long congressional discussion

# A few useful lessons (and principles)

- 1. Pensions get all the attention
- 2. A battle of ideas (or ideologies?)
- 3. Savings do not come easyly
- 4. Simplicity is king (and queen)
- 5. There is such a thing as too much choice
- 6. Legitimacy matters (a great deal)
- 7. When it comes to pension reform, process is content

## Pensions get all the attention



- Polls: pensions must urgent issue
- Paradox: poverty among
  - Elderly: 8%
  - Children: 20%
- Explanations
  - We will all be old one day
  - Retirees vote

# A battle of ideas (or ideologies?)



- 2008: the role of banks
  - Should they own AFPs?
  - Provide pension services?
- Hugely controversial
  - Split both coalitions down the middle
  - Occupied much press attention
  - Nearly exhausted congressional demand for conflict
  - Eased passage of other (more difficult, more complex) items


## Saving does not come easily

#### Density of contributions (by percentile)

p10	0,0%
p25	11,5%
p50	39,8%
p75	69,2%
p90	86,6%

- Most systems built for a labor market that does not exist: with formal, steady, high-paying jobs
- Many people are liquidity constrained, and will not contribute voluntarily
- How to obtain contributions from the self-employed?

# Simplicity is king (and queen)



- Most people do not like current pension arrangements
- But few people understand how the system works
- Paradox: policymakers have made it more complicated, not less

## There is such a thing as too much choice



- Chile: Multifondos
- Problem: excessive exposure to risk
- Problem: thinking you can beat the market
- Problem: manipulation by outside parties

## Legitimacy and trust matter

70

60

26

26

51

59

64

66

66

- Las pensiones que entrega el sistema de AFP alcanzan a financiar un nivel de vida
- Me da tranquilidad que las AFP administren los ahorros de pensión
- Las AFP han hecho una gestión eficiente de los ahorros previsionales
- Aumentar la tasa de cotización que se impone obligatoriamente en las AFP mejora el monto
- El aumento en la edad de jubilación mejora el monto de la pensión
- El empleador debe aportar un porcentaje del monto de cotización obligatoria
  - Las bajas pensiones son responsabilidad del Estado
  - El Estado debe hacerse cargo de las bajas pensiones a través de impuestos
- Las bajas pensiones son responsabilidad de las AFP
  - Sólo un cambio total en el sistema de AFP ayudaría a mejorar las pensiones
    - Muy de acuerdo (8 a 10)

Muy en desacuerdo (1 a 3)

- Pensions systems are about handing over money today in exchange for getting money back in 30 or 40 years
- To work well, system requires a great deal of trust
- Most systems enjoy very little trust & legitimacy
- Consequence: recent fund withdrawals in Peru and Chile

## Process is content



- The surfing theory of reform
- Expert committees help
- Tradeoff: expediency versus legitimacy
- Key: experts have to listen
- Key: they help sett the bounds of the discussion
- Key: they improve terms of Congressional discussion

Issues for the future

- 1. Economic: can we do something about the labor market? Pandemic offers an opportunity
- 2. Political: can capitalization systems regain legitimacy? Change model of fund administration
- 3. Fiscal: how will governments pay for pensions? Risk sharing with other contributors or with all taxpayers?



### Thank you!