

The political economy of pensions and pension reform

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A little background





- The Chile 2008 pension reform
- Contents:
 - Creation of a "solidarity pillar"
 - More competition in the market of fund administrators
- Process
 - Expert commission
 - Ministers' committee
 - Long congressional discussion

A few useful lessons (and principles)

- 1. Pensions get all the attention
- 2. A battle of ideas (or ideologies?)
- 3. Pension contributions do not come easy
- 4. Simplicity is king (and queen)
- 5. There is such a thing as too much choice
- 6. Legitimacy matters (a great deal)
- 7. When it comes to pension reform, process is content

Pensions get all the attention





- Polls: pensions must urgent issue
- Paradox: poverty among
 - Elderly: 8%
 - Children: 20%
- Explanations
 - We will all be old one day
 - Retirees vote

A battle of ideas (or ideologies?)



- 2008: the role of banks
 - Should they own AFPs?
 - Provide pension services?
- Hugely controversial
 - Split both coalitions down the middle
 - Occupied much press attention
 - Nearly exhausted congressional demand for conflict
 - Eased passage of other (more difficult, more complex) items

Contributions don't come easy


Density of contributions

(by percentile)

p10	0,0%
p25	11,5%
p50	39,8%
p75	69,2%
p90	86,6%

- Most systems built for a labor market that does not exist: with formal, steady, high-paying jobs
- Many people are liquidity constrained, and will not contribute voluntarily
- How to obtain contributions from the self-employed?

Simplicity is king (and queen)



- Most people do not like current pension arrangements
- But few people understand how the system works
- Paradox: policymakers have made it more complicated, not less

There is such a thing as too much choice




• Chile: Multifondos

 Problem: excessive exposure to risk

 Problem: thinking you can beat the market

 Problem: manipulation by outside parties

Legitimacy and trust matter



- Pensions systems are about handing over money today in exchange for getting money back in 30 or 40 years
- To work well, system requires a great deal of trust
- Most systems enjoy very little trust & legitimacy
- Consequence: recent fund withdrawals in Peru and Chile

Process is content



- The surfing theory of reform
- Expert committees help
- Tradeoff: expediency versus legitimacy
- Key: experts have to listen
- Key: they help sett the bounds of the discussion
- Key: they improve terms of Congressional discussion

Issues for the future

- Economic: can we do something about the labor market? Pandemic offers an opportunity
- Political: can capitalization systems regain legitimacy? Change model of fund administration
- 3. Fiscal: how will governments pay for pensions? Risk sharing with other contributors or with all taxpayers?



Thank you!